with Laura Alfaro, Harald Fadinger and Gede Virananda
AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 116, p. 103–108, May 2026
with Harald Fadinger and Philipp Herkenhoff
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 150, Jul. 2024
[Abstract +][Abstract −]
Abstract
We examine the effects of unilateral structural reforms within a currency union. Focusing on the surge of German competitiveness following the introduction of the Euro, we first provide reduced-form causal evidence supporting the notion that German structural labor-market reforms in the early 2000s led to a crowding-out of manufacturing employment in other Eurozone economies. To assess the impact of this German competitiveness shock, we build a quantitative multi-sector trade model that features downward nominal wage rigidities, endogenous labor supply, unemployment-insurance benefits and international savings. The fixed nominal exchange rate can create binding nominal rigidities in response to a foreign real supply shock - like the one prompted by the German reforms - resulting in significant contraction of manufacturing sectors and increased involuntary unemployment across other Eurozone countries. We consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, such as the impact of German labor-market reforms in the absence of a fixed exchange-rate regime, the role of coordinated reforms within the Eurozone and a higher average inflation rate.
[Media Coverage +][Media Coverage −]
[Slides ↗]
with Jean-Victor Alipour and Harald Fadinger
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 196, 104373, Apr. 2021
[Abstract +][Abstract −]
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of working from home (WFH) on work relations and public health during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany. Combining administrative data on SARS-CoV-2 infections and short-time work registrations, firm- and employee-level surveys and cell phone tracking data on mobility patterns, we find that working from home effectively shields employees from short-time work, firms from COVID-19 distress and substantially reduces infection risks. Counties with a higher share of teleworkable jobs experience fewer short-time work registrations and less SARS-CoV-2 cases. At the firm level, an exogenous increase in the take-up of WFH reduces the probability of filing for short-time work by up to 72 p.p. and the probability of being very negatively affected by the crisis by up to 75 p.p. Health benefits of WFH appeared mostly in the early stage of the pandemic and became smaller once tight confinement rules were implemented. This effect was driven by lower initial mobility levels in counties with more teleworkable jobs and a subsequent convergence in traffic levels once confinement was implemented. Our results imply that confinement and incentivizing WFH are substitutive policies to slow the spread of the coronavirus.
[Media Coverage +][Media Coverage −]
Media coverage
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2), DER SPIEGEL (1), DER SPIEGEL (2), Ökonomenstimme, ZDF heute, RTL, Hamburger Morgenpost, t-online, Deutschlandfunk, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mannheimer Morgen, heise online, WirtschaftsWoche, DIE ZEIT, Münchner Merkur, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Pforzheimer Zeitung, Heilbronner Stimme, HR Hessenschau, Tagesschau, MDR aktuell, SWR aktuell, Rhein Main TV, BILD, Quarks
[Working Paper Version ↗]
with Philippe Fromenteau and Jan Tscheke
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 50(3), p. 532-567, Fall 2019
[Abstract +][Abstract −]
Abstract
How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? When tougher competition reduces future profitability, firms have an incentive to shift investments towards more short-term assets. To study this mechanism empirically, we formulate a stylized theoretical framework of firm investments and derive a within-firm estimator that uses variation across investments with different durabilities. We exploit the Chinese WTO accession as a competition shock for US firms to estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of firm investments using expenditures across different assets within listed US manufacturing companies. We find that firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures towards investments with a shorter durability. We find this effect to be larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.
[Media Coverage +][Media Coverage −]
[Working Paper Version ↗]
with Dalia Marin and Alexander Tarasov
European Economic Review, Vol. 107, p. 99-132, Aug. 2018
[Abstract +][Abstract −]
Abstract
In this paper, we incorporate trade in tasks into Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that offshoring of production tasks and of managerial tasks can lead to more decentralized management and to larger executive wages in open economies. We study the predictions of the model with original firm level data and find that offshoring firms are 18% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We also find that offshoring of managers increases the level of decentralized management in open industries, but reduces the level of decentralized management in sufficiently closed industries.
[Media Coverage +][Media Coverage −]
[Data and Code ↗]
[Working Paper Version ↗]
European Economic Review, Vol. 102, p. 39-61, Feb. 2018
[Abstract +][Abstract −]
Abstract
How does globalization affect the balance of power between managers and firm owners? This paper studies the effect of economic integration on governance practices within firms. I propose a theory of endogenous corporate governance investments in industry equilibrium with monopolistic competition. Firms can use investments into better corporate governance as a cheap substitute to performance compensation to mitigate agency problems. International integration alters the demand for managers in the economy such that firms may reduce their corporate governance investments and offer higher performance payments. This globalization-induced deterioration of corporate governance in the economy diminishes the welfare gains from globalization. Using data on governance practices in U.S. manufacturing corporations, I provide empirical evidence that conforms to the model predictions. Firms in industries that experienced substantial trade liberalization between 1990 and 2006 have changed their governance practices allowing for more managerial slack and offered higher equity payments to their CEOs. These effects are particularly large in relatively dynamic industries that are characterized by large exit rates.
[Media Coverage +][Media Coverage −]
[Data and Code ↗]
[Working Paper Version ↗]