Capital (Mis)allocation, Incentives
and Productivity
[Abstract]
with Matthias Meier, Alexander Schramm and Alexander Schwemmer
Abstract: This paper studies how managerial pay shapes the allocation of capital within firms. We leverage quasi-experimental variation in the composition of managerial pay between cash bonuses and equity compensation. We find that a relative increase in cash bonuses leads firms to reallocate capital toward less durable investment projects. To rationalize the empirical evidence, we develop a quantitative model with agency frictions. In the model, a relative increase in cash bonuses strengthens managerial short-termism, which shifts the investment composition toward less durable projects. The observed change in managerial pay exacerbates within-firm capital misallocation and leads to a sizeable contraction in output.
International Trade, Top Earners and Stock Market Wealth
[Abstract]
Awarded the FIW International Economics Conference Best Paper Award and the Walther-Rathenau Best Paper Award [Link]
Abstract: This paper proposes a novel channel through which international trade influences inequality: the propagation of stock market wealth. Corporate top earners receive a substantial portion of their compensation through stock ownership. Globalization impacts their stock market wealth both via capital gains from equity price appreciations and through new equity grants. These adjustments shift compensation from labor income towards capital income at the top of the income distribution. Exploiting variation in individual stock market wealth of US and UK executives in their firms and an instrumental variable strategy based on foreign input supply shocks, I provide evidence for this channel. I develop a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms, where managers are compensated with labor income and stock ownership to mitigate agency frictions. The model rationalizes that rising input imports have concentrated stock market wealth more strongly than labor incomes at the top.
Industrial Policy in Supply Chains and Directed Technological Change: Evidence from Rare Earths
with Laura Alfaro,
Harald Fadinger and Gede Virananda
[Abstract]
Abstract: Industrial policies, traditionally aimed at boosting the competitiveness of protected sectors, can unintentionally drive productivity growth in downstream sectors abroad. We document this mechanism using the case of rare earth elements (REE) -- critical inputs for manufacturing and the green transformation, with production highly concentrated in China. To assess the importance of REE across industries, we construct an input-output table incorporating individual REE inputs. Using REE-related patents classified by a large language model and sectoral TFP data, we show that the introduction of REE export restrictions by China led to a global surge in innovation in REE-intensive downstream sectors outside of China. Additionally, exports by these sectors increased, following the adverse REE supply shock. To rationalize these findings and quantify the global impact of the Chinese REE policies, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of trade and directed technological change. Under endogenous technologies, input-supply restrictions shift the direction of innovation in downstream sectors toward scarce inputs when inputs are gross complements, which can lead to the expansion of these sectors.
On the Importance of Manufacturing Order Backlog
with Matthias Meier and
Bjarne Horst
In cooperation with the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis)
Trade Policy and the Geography of Global Production
with Harald Fadinger and Lei Li
Quantifying the Germany Shock: Structural Labor-Market Reforms and Spillovers in a Currency Union
[Abstract], [Media Coverage], [Slides]
with Harald Fadinger and Philipp Herkenhoff
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 150, Jul. 2024
Abstract: We examine the effects of unilateral structural reforms within a currency union. Focusing on the surge of German competitiveness following the introduction of the Euro, we first provide reduced-form causal evidence supporting the notion that German structural labor-market reforms in the early 2000s led to a crowding-out of manufacturing employment in other Eurozone economies. To assess the impact of this German competitiveness shock, we build a quantitative multi-sector trade model that features downward nominal wage rigidities, endogenous labor supply, unemployment-insurance benefits and international savings. The fixed nominal exchange rate can create binding nominal rigidities in response to a foreign real supply shock - like the one prompted by the German reforms - resulting in significant contraction of manufacturing sectors and increased involuntary unemployment across other Eurozone countries. We consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, such as the impact of German labor-market reforms in the absence of a fixed exchange-rate regime, the role of coordinated reforms within the Eurozone and a higher average inflation rate.
My Home is My Castle - The Benefits of Working from Home During a Pandemic Crisis
with Jean-Victor Alipour and Harald Fadinger
[Abstract], [Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 196, 104373, Apr. 2021
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of working from home (WFH) on work relations and public health during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany. Combining administrative data on SARS-CoV-2 infections and short-time work registrations, firm- and employee-level surveys and cell phone tracking data on mobility patterns, we find that working from home effectively shields employees from short-time work, firms from COVID-19 distress and substantially reduces infection risks. Counties with a higher share of teleworkable jobs experience fewer short-time work registrations and less SARS-CoV-2 cases. At the firm level, an exogenous increase in the take-up of WFH reduces the probability of filing for short-time work by up to 72 p.p. and the probability of being very negatively affected by the crisis by up to 75 p.p. Health benefits of WFH appeared mostly in the early stage of the pandemic and became smaller once tight confinement rules were implemented. This effect was driven by lower initial mobility levels in counties with more teleworkable jobs and a subsequent convergence in traffic levels once confinement was implemented. Our results imply that confinement and incentivizing WFH are substitutive policies to slow the spread of the coronavirus.
Foreign Competition and the Durability of U.S. Firm Investments
with Philippe Fromenteau and Jan Tscheke
[Abstract],
[Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 50(3), p. 532-567, Fall 2019
Abstract: How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? When tougher competition reduces future profitability, firms have an incentive to shift investments towards more short-term assets. To study this mechanism empirically, we formulate a stylized theoretical framework of firm investments and derive a within-firm estimator that uses variation across investments with different durabilities. We exploit the Chinese WTO accession as a competition shock for US firms to estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of firm investments using expenditures across different assets within listed US manufacturing companies. We find that firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures towards investments with a shorter durability. We find this effect to be larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.
Trade in Tasks and the Organization of Firms
with Dalia Marin and Alexander Tarasov
[Abstract],
[Data and Code],
[Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
European Economic Review, Vol. 107, p. 99-132, Aug. 2018
Abstract: In this paper, we incorporate trade in tasks into Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that offshoring of production tasks and of managerial tasks can lead to more decentralized management and to larger executive wages in open economies. We study the predictions of the model with original firm level data and find that offshoring firms are 18% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We also find that offshoring of managers increases the level of decentralized management in open industries, but reduces the level of decentralized management in sufficiently closed industries.
Globalization and the Evolution of Corporate Governance
[Abstract], [Data and Code],
[Media Coverage], [Working Paper Version]
European Economic Review, Vol. 102, p. 39-61, Feb. 2018.
Abstract: How does globalization affect the balance of power between managers and firm owners? This paper studies the effect of economic integration on governance practices within firms. I propose a theory of endogenous corporate governance investments in industry equilibrium with monopolistic competition. Firms can use investments into better corporate governance as a cheap substitute to performance compensation to mitigate agency problems. International integration alters the demand for managers in the economy such that firms may reduce their corporate governance investments and offer higher performance payments. This globalization-induced deterioration of corporate governance in the economy diminishes the welfare gains from globalization. Using data on governance practices in U.S. manufacturing corporations, I provide empirical evidence that conforms to the model predictions. Firms in industries that experienced substantial trade liberalization between 1990 and 2006 have changed their governance practices allowing for more managerial slack and offered higher equity payments to their CEOs. These effects are particularly large in relatively dynamic industries that are characterized by large exit rates.
The Costs and Benefits of Home Office during the Covid-19 Pandemic - Evidence from Infections and an Input-Output Model for Germany
with Harald Fadinger
[Abstract],
[Media Coverage],
[Data and Code],
CEPR Covid Economics, Vol. 9, p. 107-134, Apr. 2020
Democratization, Contracts and Comparative Advantage
with Felix Samy Soliman
[Abstract], [Working Paper Version]
Economics Letters, Vol. 173, p. 73-77, Dec. 2018.