ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of global sourcing on inequality at the top of corporate hierarchies, using a linked manager-firm dataset covering information for more than 25,000 managers across listed firms in the U.S. and the U.K. I find that global sourcing contributed substantially to rising top inequality, in particular due to an increasing dispersion in the value of managers' equity ownership. To rationalize these empirical regularities, I develop a model that introduces simple incentive comprenation contracts into a multi-sector span-of-control assignment model that endogenizes the level and sensitivity of managerial compensation in general equilibrium. An increase in the supply of foreign production labor raises top inequality in managerial incomes and equity wealth across domestic firms such that managers in larger firms obtain steeper incentives due to larger pay-performance sensitivity. This mechanism increases wealth-performance sensitivities of managers in relatively large firms due to an appreciation of the firms' stock prices. Estimating the model for the U.S. and the U.K. suggests that the global division of labor can explain a substantial fraction of the variation in managerial incomes.