Welcome
I am an Economist working at the University of Mannheim. My work focuses broadly on International Economics, Organizational Economics and Macroeconomics.
My research is funded by the Collaborative Research Center TR 224
"Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges - Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability"
of the German Science Foundation (DFG).
Working Papers
Quantifying the Germany Shock: Structural Reforms and Spillovers in a Currency Union
[Abstract]
with Harald Fadinger and Philipp Herkenhoff
Abstract: We examine the effects of unilateral structural reforms within a currency union. Focusing on the surge of German competitiveness following the introduction of the Euro, we first
provide reduced-form causal evidence supporting the notion that German structural labor-market reforms in the early 2000s led to a crowding-out of manufacturing employment in other Eurozone
economies. To assess the impact of this German competitiveness shock, we build a quantitative multi-sector trade model that features downward nominal wage rigidities, endogenous labor supply,
unemployment-insurance benefits and international savings. The fixed nominal exchange rate can create binding nominal rigidities in response to a foreign real supply shock - like the one prompted by the German reforms - resulting in significant contraction of manufacturing sectors and increased involuntary unemployment across other Eurozone countries.
We consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, such as the impact of German labor-market reforms in the absence of a fixed exchange-rate regime, the role of coordinated reforms
within the Eurozone and a higher average inflation rate.
Human Capitalists, Reallocation and International Trade
[Abstract]
Awarded the FIW International Economics Conference Best Paper Award 2019, Vienna
and the Walther-Rathenau Best Paper Award [Link]
Abstract: This paper studies how economic reallocation across firms affects corporate top earners. Using the rise of intermediate-goods imports in the US and the UK as a source for economic reallocation, I establish that economic reallocation affects corporate top earners mostly via adjustments in equity ownership rather than via adjustments in labor income. This implies that skill premia (relative wages) underestimate the role of trade in explaining rising top inequality. To rationalize this finding, I build and calibrate a heterogeneous-firm model that incorporates incentive contracting.
Capital (Mis)allocation, Incentives
and Productivity
[Abstract]
with Matthias Meier, Alexander Schramm and Alexander Schwemmer
Abstract: This paper argues that managerial incentives can cause within-firm capital misallocation. We document empirically that managers reallocate capital towards less durable investment projects
when their financial incentives become more short-term oriented. To quantify this channel of within-firm misallocation for the US economy, we build a model of firm investments under
agency frictions, in which capital misallocation within firms arises from short-termist incentives. Shifts from equity ownership to bonus payments increase managers' focus on current
cash flows, leading to underinvestment in low-depreciation assets. This increases wedges in the rates of return across assets within firms, lowering average productivity.
Publications
My Home is My Castle - The Benefits of Working from Home During a Pandemic Crisis
with Jean-Victor Alipour and Harald Fadinger
[Abstract], [Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 196, 104373, Apr. 2021
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of working from home (WFH) on work relations and public
health during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany. Combining administrative data on SARS-CoV-2 infections
and short-time work registrations, firm- and employee-level surveys and cell phone tracking data on
mobility patterns, we find that working from home effectively shields employees from short-time work,
firms from COVID-19 distress and substantially reduces infection risks. Counties with a higher share
of teleworkable jobs experience fewer short-time work registrations and less SARS-CoV-2 cases. At the
firm level, an exogenous increase in the take-up of WFH reduces the probability of filing for short-time
work by up to 72 p.p. and the probability of being very negatively affected by the crisis by up to 75 p.p.
Health benefits of WFH appeared mostly in the early stage of the pandemic and became smaller once tight
confinement rules were implemented. This effect was driven by lower initial mobility levels in counties with
more teleworkable jobs and a subsequent convergence in traffic levels once confinement was implemented. Our results imply
that confinement and incentivizing WFH are substitutive policies to slow the spread of the coronavirus.
The Costs and Benefits of Home Office during the Covid-19 Pandemic - Evidence from Infections and an Input-Output Model for Germany
with Harald Fadinger
[Abstract],
[Media Coverage],
[Data and Code],
CEPR Covid Economics, Vol. 9, p. 107-134, Apr. 2020
Abstract: We study the impact of working from home on (i) infection risk in German regions and (ii) output using an input-output (IO) model
of the German economy. We find that working from home is very effective in reducing infection risk: regions whose industry structure
allows for a larger fraction of work to be done from home experienced much fewer Covid-19 cases and fatalities. Moreover, confinement
is significantly more costly in terms of induced output loss in regions where the share of workers who can work from home is lower.
When phasing out confinement, home office should be maintained as long as possible, to allow those workers who cannot work from home
to go back to work, while keeping infection risk minimal. Finally, systemic industries (with high multipliers and/or high value added
per worker) should be given priority, especially those where home office is not possible.
Foreign Competition and the Durability of U.S. Firm Investments
with Philippe Fromenteau and Jan Tscheke
[Abstract],
[Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 50(3), p. 532-567, Fall 2019
Abstract: How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? When tougher competition reduces future profitability,
firms have an incentive to shift investments towards more short-term assets. To study this mechanism empirically, we formulate a stylized theoretical framework of
firm investments and derive a within-firm estimator that uses variation across investments with different durabilities. We exploit the Chinese WTO accession as a
competition shock for US firms to estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of firm investments using expenditures across different assets
within listed US manufacturing companies. We find that firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures towards investments with a shorter
durability. We find this effect to be larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.
Trade in Tasks and the Organization of Firms
with Dalia Marin and Alexander Tarasov
[Abstract],
[Data and Code],
[Media Coverage],
[Working Paper Version]
European Economic Review, Vol. 107, p. 99-132, Aug. 2018
Abstract: In this paper, we incorporate trade in tasks into Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that offshoring of production tasks
and of managerial tasks can lead to more decentralized management and to larger executive wages in open economies. We study the predictions of the model with original firm level data and
find that offshoring firms are 18% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We also find that offshoring of managers increases the level of decentralized management in open
industries, but reduces the level of decentralized management in sufficiently closed industries.
Globalization and the Evolution of Corporate Governance
[Abstract], [Data and Code],
[Media Coverage], [Working Paper Version]
European Economic Review, Vol. 102, p. 39-61, Feb. 2018.
Abstract: How does globalization affect the balance of power between managers and firm owners? This paper studies the effect of economic integration on governance
practices within firms. I propose a theory of endogenous corporate governance investments in industry equilibrium with monopolistic competition. Firms can use investments
into better corporate governance as a cheap substitute to performance compensation to mitigate agency problems. International integration alters the demand for managers
in the economy such that firms may reduce their corporate governance investments and offer higher performance payments. This globalization-induced deterioration of
corporate governance in the economy diminishes the welfare gains from globalization. Using data on governance practices in U.S. manufacturing corporations, I provide
empirical evidence that conforms to the model predictions. Firms in industries that experienced substantial trade liberalization between 1990 and 2006 have changed their
governance practices allowing for more managerial slack and offered higher equity payments to their CEOs. These effects are particularly large in relatively dynamic
industries that are characterized by large exit rates.
Democratization, Contracts and Comparative Advantage
with Felix Samy Soliman
[Abstract], [Working Paper Version]
Economics Letters, Vol. 173, p. 73-77, Dec. 2018.
Abstract: We study how the international spread of democracy shaped the comparative advantage of countries. Using data on the "Third Wave of Democratization"
between 1976 and 2000 we find that democratizing countries shifted their exports towards more contract intensive goods that require a larger portion of
relationship-specific inputs. This shift is observed on the intensive margin (volumes of industry-level exports) as well as the extensive margin of
trade (number of goods a country exports). Using an instrumental variable strategy based on democracy waves, alternative proxy variables and
subsamples suggests that the effects of democratization on trade specialization are causal.
Work in Progress
Global Value Chains of Rare-Earth Industries
with Laura Alfaro and Harald Fadinger
Trade Policy and the Geography of Global Production
with Harald Fadinger and Lei Li
Order Cancellations
with Matthias Meier
